For background, Discord is a centralized U.S.-based platform operating under U.S. law, with standard compliance and data-handling realities. Discord does not provide end-to-end encryption for text messages. It shouldn’t be surprising that it responds to lawful government data requests through a dedicated portal[1][2]. In 2026, it is expanding age-verification requirements globally — users may be asked to complete a facial age estimation or submit a government-issued photo ID to access certain features and settings[3][4]. In October 2025, roughly 70,000 government ID images were exposed in a breach involving a third-party vendor Discord used for age-related verification appeals[5][6].
At Software for Good, core to our Digital Resilience work is helping mission-driven organizations evaluate platform exposure before a crisis forces the issue. And with the upcoming changes to Discord’s privacy posture, we decided to evaluate some open-source alternatives. We reviewed nine other tools, including their vendor documentation, security disclosures, and public vulnerability records, to ground the comparison in verifiable claims.
Here’s what we found.
The Short Version
There’s no perfect option. Every tool on this list requires tradeoffs between encryption and ease of use, resilience and setup effort, and cost and capability. The right choice depends on what your community actually needs and what threats you’re facing.
If your biggest concern is getting shut down
Matrix/Element is the only option here with both built-in end-to-end encryption and open federation. That means no single company or server controls whether your community can talk to each other. If your organizing has been disrupted by platforms pulling access before, this matters.
It’s not without issues. Metadata leaks across federation, server admins can see who’s talking to whom and when, even if they can’t read the messages. Group encryption has limited forward secrecy. The parent entities are UK-based. And the setup learning curve is steeper than most of the other options here.
If encryption quality is what matters most
Wire has the strongest cryptography we looked at. It’s the first messenger to ship a full implementation of Messaging Layer Security (MLS), the IETF standard that Wire helped write. Swiss and German jurisdiction. Independently audited by Kudelski Security and X41 D-Sec. The German Chancellery and over 30 federal ministries use it for classified communications.
It’s centralized though, so you don’t get the deplatforming resilience of Matrix. The free tier is pretty limited. And it stores more metadata than Signal does (usernames, device IDs, connection graphs) to support multi-device sync and enterprise features. If your group can handle a paid plan and your main worry is someone reading your messages rather than someone shutting down your platform, Wire is worth a serious look.
If you just need to get people moved quickly
Mattermost and Rocket.Chat are the closest to what people are used to from Discord and Slack. Both are open source and self-hostable. Neither has native end-to-end encryption, which means your server admin and anyone who compromises the server can read messages.
Both have large US Department of Defense customer bases. Depending on your community, that’s either reassuring (the software is battle-tested) or a red flag. Your call.
Rocket.Chat feels more like Discord. Mattermost is more stable for long-term use.
If important things keep getting lost in chat
Zulip takes a fundamentally different approach to group communication. Instead of channels where everything scrolls by, every conversation is threaded by topic. If your community’s actual problem is that decisions and important information disappear into chat noise, Zulip might matter more than encryption. It’s open source under the Apache license, and they give free hosting to grassroots communities, open-source projects, and small nonprofits. No E2EE though.
Discourse is primarily a forum platform with structured discussions, though it now includes real-time chat features. It works best as a complement to chat-heavy tools rather than a direct replacement for Discord-style communication.
Not quite the right fit
Signal is the best private messenger available, and your organizers should probably already be using it. End-to-end encrypted by default, open source, run by a nonprofit, collects almost no metadata. If subpoenaed, Signal can only produce your phone number, account creation date, and last connection date. But it’s a messenger, not a workspace. No channels, no servers, no threading, no persistent community spaces. Groups cap at 1,000 with basic admin controls. It’s a great tool your organizers use for private conversations, but it’s not ideal for growing a large community.
Revolt looks like Discord and the project has good energy behind it, but it’s not ready for communities facing threats. No E2EE, no security audit. It was involved in a breach tied to Andrew Tate’s “Real World” platform in late 2024.
Mumble is voice-only and the server can hear everything (it decrypts and re-encrypts audio). Fine for casual voice chat, not a Discord replacement.
The Full Comparison
| Tool | Function | Real-time? | Open Src? | Self-Host? | Complexity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Matrix / Element | Decentralized federated chat with E2EE, voice/video | Yes | Yes (AGPL) | Yes | High |
| Key Threats: Federation exposes metadata to participating servers; UK-based core entities; group encryption design tradeoffs (Megolm) | |||||
| Wire | Secure team chat with voice/video | Yes | Yes (GPLv3 clients, AGPL server) | Yes | High |
| Key Threats: Centralized service model; metadata retained at service layer; limited federation; enterprise-focused pricing | |||||
| Mattermost | Slack/Discord-style team chat | Yes | Yes (AGPL) | Yes | Medium |
| Key Threats: No native E2EE; message content accessible at server/database level; US jurisdiction; significant U.S. federal customer base | |||||
| Rocket.Chat | Team communication with channels, threading, voice/video | Yes | Yes (MIT) | Yes | Medium |
| Key Threats: E2EE optional and not default in most deployments; U.S./Brazil jurisdiction; notable government customer base | |||||
| Zulip | Topic-based threaded team chat | Yes | Yes (Apache) | Yes | Medium |
| Key Threats: No native E2EE; primarily server-trust model; U.S.-based hosting for cloud tier | |||||
| Discourse | Modern forum platform with integrated chat | Partial | Yes (GPL) | Yes | Medium |
| Key Threats: No native E2EE; designed for persistent forum-style discussions; standard web application vulnerability surface | |||||
| Signal | Encrypted messenger with group chat, voice/video | Yes | Yes (AGPL) | No (effectively) | High |
| Key Threats: Messenger, not a workspace — no channels, servers, or threading; 1,000-member group cap; US jurisdiction (but minimal data to produce); phone number required to register; centralized, no federation | |||||
| Revolt | Discord-style servers, channels, voice | Yes | Yes (AGPL) | Yes | Medium-High |
| Key Threats: No native E2EE; limited formal security auditing; maturing ecosystem; prior security incidents in related deployments | |||||
| Mumble | Low-latency voice chat (VoIP) | Yes | Yes (BSD) | Yes | Low |
| Key Threats: Server-mediated encryption (not end-to-end); voice-only; limited maintained mobile support | |||||
Actually making the move
The hardest part of leaving Discord isn’t picking the tool. It’s getting people to come with you. Folks are comfortable. The interface is familiar. “It’s fine for now” is hard to argue with until it isn’t.
But the point of thinking about digital resilience is to make these decisions before they’re made for you; before the subpoena, before the breach, before the policy change that cuts off your community overnight. Who can read your messages today? Who decides whether your community can communicate tomorrow? What happens to your data if this platform gets acquired?
We can help with this
This is part of what we do at Software for Good. Our Digital Resilience practice helps nonprofits, advocacy organizations, and community groups figure out where their digital infrastructure is vulnerable and what to do about it.
If your community needs to move off Discord, or if this post has you thinking about other platform dependencies you haven’t addressed yet, reach out. We do Risk & Resilience Audits, Security & Privacy Strategy, Technology Independence, and Training/Capacity Building.
P.S. If you’d like a practical framework for evaluating your communications risk, our Digital Resilience Toolkit is available to download.
Sources
[1] How Discord Works with Law Enforcement — Discord
[2] Transparency Hub — Discord Safety
[3] A Safer Discord by Default: New Teen Safety Updates — Discord
[5] Update on a Security Incident Involving Third-Party Customer Service — Discord
[6] 70,000 Government ID Photos Exposed in Discord User Hack — NBC News